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(Original Signature of Member)

118TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

**H. R.** \_\_\_\_\_

To require reports on and impose sanctions with respect to Iran’s development of space-launch vehicles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, and for other purposes.

\_\_\_\_\_  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. STEFANIK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the  
Committee on \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
**A BILL**

To require reports on and impose sanctions with respect to Iran’s development of space-launch vehicles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
5 “No ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—SANCTIONS AND REPORT ON IRANIAN SPACE-LAUNCH VEHICLES AND INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

- Sec. 101. Findings; sense of Congress.
- Sec. 102. Determination and mandatory imposition of sanctions under Executive Order 13382.
- Sec. 103. Report on support for Iran’s space, aerospace, and ballistic missile sectors and United States capacity to deny intercontinental ballistic missile attacks from Iran.
- Sec. 104. Report on senior officials of Government of Iran responsible for space-launch vehicle or ballistic missile tests.

TITLE II—SANCTIONS AND REPORTS RELATING TO IRANIAN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

- Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
- Sec. 202. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.
- Sec. 203. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems in enforcement of arms embargos under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
- Sec. 204. Inclusion of unmanned aerial systems under Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992.
- Sec. 205. Strategy to counter Iranian unmanned aerial systems.
- Sec. 206. Report on support for Iran’s unmanned aerial system program and related technology transfers.
- Sec. 207. Unmanned aerial system defined.

TITLE III—EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996

- Sec. 301. Expansion of Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.

1 **TITLE I—SANCTIONS AND RE-**  
 2 **PORT ON IRANIAN SPACE-**  
 3 **LAUNCH VEHICLES AND**  
 4 **INTERCONTINENTAL BAL-**  
 5 **LISTIC MISSILES**

6 **SEC. 101. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
8 ings:

- 9 (1) The Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest  
10 ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, which

1 Iran uses to threaten forces of the United States  
2 and partners of the United States in the region.

3 (2) Iran is progressing toward developing an  
4 intercontinental ballistic missile (commonly referred  
5 to an “ICBM”) capability. In 2023, the Defense In-  
6 telligence Agency reported that Iran’s progress on  
7 its space-launch vehicles shortens the time needed  
8 for Iran to produce an ICBM since space-launch ve-  
9 hicles and ICBMs use similar technologies.

10 (3) Iran continues to rely on illicit foreign pro-  
11 curement to support its long-range missile aspira-  
12 tions. For example, Iran recently tried to purchase  
13 from the Russian Federation and the People’s Re-  
14 public of China ammonium perchlorate, which is the  
15 main ingredient in solid propellants to power mis-  
16 siles.

17 (4) Iran relies at least in part on networks in  
18 Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China to  
19 procure dual-use materials and equipment for its  
20 longer-range ballistic missile program.

21 (5) North Korea historically has played a role  
22 in supporting longer-range Iranian ballistic missile  
23 capabilities. Specifically, North Korea provided the  
24 Nodong-A to Iran in the 1990s, which Iran used to  
25 develop both its first nuclear-capable medium-range

1 ballistic missile and liquid propellant engines for its  
2 space-launch vehicles.

3 (6) While the Iran Space Agency, a government  
4 organization subject to sanctions, develops space ca-  
5 pabilities for Iran’s ministry of defense as well as  
6 the communications sector, Iran’s Revolutionary  
7 Guard Corps Aerospace Force (commonly referred to  
8 as the “IRGC–AF”) runs a parallel space program  
9 employing solid-propellant motors, which if used in  
10 ICBM technology, would enable launches with little  
11 warning.

12 (7) Iran continues work on larger diameter  
13 solid-propellant motors, like the Rafa’e, and is now  
14 reportedly in the possession of an all-solid-propellant  
15 space-launch vehicle called the Qaem–100. The  
16 Qaem–100 was reportedly tested twice, once in No-  
17 vember 2022 and again in March 2023.

18 (8) The IRGC–AF last successfully launched a  
19 satellite into orbit in September 2023 using its  
20 Qased rocket, fueled by both liquid- and solid-fueled  
21 stages.

22 (9) Iran’s development, production, and trans-  
23 fer of space-launch vehicle and ballistic missile tech-  
24 nology violated Annex B of United Nations Security  
25 Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which enshrined

1 certain restrictions under the Joint Comprehensive  
2 Plan of Action. Those restrictions expired on Octo-  
3 ber 18, 2023.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
5 gress that—

6 (1) Iran’s space program continues to function  
7 as a cover for Iran’s quest for an ICBM;

8 (2) the possession by Iran of an ICBM would  
9 pose a direct threat to the United States homeland  
10 and partners of the United States in Europe; and

11 (3) the United States should work to deny Iran  
12 the ability to hold the United States homeland or  
13 European partners of the United States at risk with  
14 an ICBM.

15 **SEC. 102. DETERMINATION AND MANDATORY IMPOSITION**  
16 **OF SANCTIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER**  
17 **13382.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall—

20 (1) determine whether each individual or entity  
21 specified in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the  
22 imposition of sanctions under Executive Order  
23 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking  
24 property of weapons of mass destruction  
25 proliferators and their supporters); and

1           (2) with respect to any such individual or entity  
2           the President determines does meet such criteria,  
3           impose such sanctions.

4           (b) INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES SPECIFIED.—The  
5           individuals and entities specified in this subsection are the  
6           following:

7           (1) The Space Division of the IRGC–AF.

8           (2) All senior officers of the IRGC–AF.

9           (3) Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, the  
10          commander of the IRGC–AF.

11          (4) General Majid Mousavi, the deputy com-  
12          mander of the IRGC–AF.

13          (5) Second Brigadier General Ali-Jafarabadi,  
14          the commander of the Space Division of the IRGC–  
15          AF.

16 **SEC. 103. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN’S SPACE, AERO-**  
17 **SPACE, AND BALLISTIC MISSILE SECTORS**  
18 **AND UNITED STATES CAPACITY TO DENY**  
19 **INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE AT-**  
20 **TACKS FROM IRAN.**

21          (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
22          date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-  
23          fense, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury,  
24          the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and  
25          the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the

1 congressional defense committees a report that includes  
2 the following:

3 (1) An identification of entities in Iran not sub-  
4 ject to sanctions imposed by the United States as of  
5 the date of the report that are helping to support  
6 Iran's space, aerospace, and ballistic missile sectors,  
7 including public and private entities making a mate-  
8 rial contribution to Iran's development of space-  
9 launch vehicles or ICBMs.

10 (2) An identification of the countries the gov-  
11 ernments of which continue to support Iran's space,  
12 aerospace, and ballistic missile activities.

13 (3) With respect to each country identified  
14 under paragraph (2), the following:

15 (A) Actions taken by the government of  
16 the country or other entities within the country  
17 to support Iran's space, aerospace, and ballistic  
18 missile activities, including the transfer of mis-  
19 siles, engines, propellant or materials that can  
20 be used for fuel, or other technologies that  
21 could make a material contribution to develop-  
22 ment of space-launch vehicles or ICBMs.

23 (B) Any actions described in subparagraph  
24 (A) or proposals for such actions being nego-  
25 tiated or discussed as of the date of the report.

1 (4) An assessment of Iran's ICBM technology,  
2 including the following:

3 (A) Key steps Iran would need to take to  
4 develop an ICBM.

5 (B) An assessment of which rocket motors  
6 Iran would likely use to build an ICBM.

7 (C) Technological hurdles Iran would still  
8 need to overcome to develop an ICBM.

9 (D) Pathways to overcome the hurdles de-  
10 scribed in subparagraph (C), including the po-  
11 tential transfer of technologies from North  
12 Korea, the Russian Federation, or the People's  
13 Republic of China.

14 (E) An estimated timeline for Iran to de-  
15 velop an ICBM if Iran chooses to do so.

16 (5) An assessment of the missile defense capa-  
17 bilities of the United States, as of the date of the  
18 report and anticipated for the future, with respect to  
19 denying an attack by Iran on the United States  
20 homeland, including the following:

21 (A) An assessment of the ability of the  
22 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, as it  
23 exists on the date of the enactment of this Act,  
24 to prevent such an attack.



1           (B) An assessment of how the procurement  
2           of the Next Generation Interceptor would im-  
3           prove the ability of the United States to inter-  
4           cept ICBMs launched from Iran.

5           (C) How a third missile defense site on the  
6           East Coast of the United States would improve  
7           the ability of the United States to intercept  
8           ICBMs launched from Iran.

9           (b) UPDATES.—As new information becomes avail-  
10          able and not less frequently than annually, the Secretary  
11          shall submit to the congressional defense committees an  
12          updated version of the report required by subsection (a)  
13          that includes updated information under paragraphs (1)  
14          through (4) of that subsection.

15          (c) FORM.—Each report submitted under this section  
16          shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include  
17          a classified annex.

18          (d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE-  
19          FINED.—In this section, the term “congressional defense  
20          committees” has the meaning given that term in section  
21          101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

1 **SEC. 104. REPORT ON SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GOVERNMENT**  
2 **OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR SPACE-LAUNCH**  
3 **VEHICLE OR BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the  
5 date on which the President determines that the Govern-  
6 ment of Iran has conducted a test of a space-launch vehi-  
7 cle or ballistic missile, the President shall submit to the  
8 appropriate congressional committees a notification that  
9 identifies each senior official of the Government of Iran  
10 that the President determines is responsible for ordering,  
11 controlling, or otherwise directing the test.

12 (b) ELEMENTS.—The notification required by sub-  
13 section (a) shall include—

14 (1) available information on the ballistic missile  
15 or the generic class of ballistic missile or space rock-  
16 et that was launched;

17 (2) the trajectory, duration, range, and altitude  
18 of the flight of the missile or rocket;

19 (3) the duration, range, and altitude of the  
20 flight of each stage of the missile or rocket;

21 (4) the location of the launch point and impact  
22 point;

23 (5) the payload; and

24 (6) other technical information that is available.

1 (c) FORM.—The notification required by subsection  
2 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may con-  
3 tain a classified annex.

4 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES  
5 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-  
6 gressional committees” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
8 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-  
9 fairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Se-  
10 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

11 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
12 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on  
13 Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Com-  
14 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-  
15 tives.

16 **TITLE II—SANCTIONS AND RE-**  
17 **PORTS RELATING TO IRA-**  
18 **NIAN UNMANNED AERIAL**  
19 **SYSTEMS**

20 **SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
22 ings:

23 (1) Iran has a robust unmanned aerial system  
24 program under which Iran operates several un-  
25 manned aerial systems, including combat drones,

1       drones capable of conducting intelligence, surveil-  
2       lance, and reconnaissance, and suicide or kamikaze  
3       drones.

4           (2) As of December 2022, Iran reportedly sup-  
5       plied more than 1,700 unmanned aerial systems to  
6       the Russian Federation, including several hundred of  
7       the Shahed–136 suicide drone.

8           (3) Iran and the Russian Federation are report-  
9       edly planning to build 6,000 Geran–2 drones, the  
10      Russian-made version of the Iranian Shahed–136, at  
11      a new facility in the Russian Federation.

12          (4) The Iranian supply of unmanned aerial sys-  
13      tems to the Russian Federation has fueled the Rus-  
14      sian Federation’s murderous invasion of Ukraine  
15      and caused countless civilian deaths.

16          (5) The United States found parts made by  
17      more than a dozen United States or western compa-  
18      nies in an Iranian unmanned aerial system downed  
19      in Ukraine, which are likely transferred to Iran ille-  
20      gally.

21          (6) Iran is also responsible for the proliferation  
22      of unmanned aerial systems to terrorist groups in  
23      the Middle East, including Hamas in Gaza,  
24      Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen,  
25      which have all employed drones in their murderous

1 attacks on Israel following the October 7, 2023, ter-  
2 rorist attacks by Hamas in Israel, which killed more  
3 than 1,400 innocent civilians.

4 (7) Iran's transfer of unmanned aerial systems  
5 to other governments and terrorist groups has vio-  
6 lated Annex B of United Nations Security Council  
7 Resolution 2231 (2015) and restrictions imposed  
8 under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,  
9 which expired on October 18, 2023.

10 (8) Upon the expiration of those restrictions,  
11 Iran's transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems  
12 and ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and the  
13 Russian Federation became legal under international  
14 law.

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
16 gress that—

17 (1) Iran's unmanned aerial system program  
18 contributes significantly to the instability of the Mid-  
19 dle East and threatens the security of the United  
20 States and its partners in the Middle East, including  
21 Israel;

22 (2) the provision of Iranian unmanned aerial  
23 systems gives the Russian Federation an advantage  
24 in its war in Ukraine and contributes to the dan-

1       gerous partnership between Iran and the Russian  
2       Federation;

3               (3) the expiration of restrictions under the  
4       Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Annex B of  
5       United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 on  
6       October 18, 2023, helps facilitate Iran’s development  
7       and transfer of deadly unmanned aerial systems and  
8       ballistic missiles to actors like Hamas and the Rus-  
9       sian Federation; and

10              (4) the United States should seek to hinder  
11       Iran’s unmanned aerial system production, its trans-  
12       fer of such systems to the Russian Federation,  
13       Hamas, and other hostile state and non-state actors,  
14       and to prevent the further use of United States com-  
15       ponents in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

16 **SEC. 202. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND**  
17                               **CRUISE MISSILES UNDER COMPREHENSIVE**  
18                               **IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DI-**  
19                               **VESTMENT ACT OF 2010.**

20       (a) FINDINGS.—Section 2(1) of the Comprehensive  
21       Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of  
22       2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501(1)) is amended by striking “and  
23       ballistic missiles” and inserting “, ballistic missiles, and  
24       unmanned aerial systems and cruise missiles”.

1 (b) INCLUSION IN GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECH-  
2 NOLOGIES OF DIVERSION CONCERN.—Section  
3 302(b)(1)(B) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Ac-  
4 countability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.  
5 8542(b)(1)(B)) is amended—

6 (1) in clause (ii), by striking “; or” and insert-  
7 ing a semicolon;

8 (2) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause (iv);  
9 and

10 (3) by inserting after clause (ii) the following:

11 “(iii) unmanned aerial system (as de-  
12 fined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or  
13 Drones for Iran Act of 2023) or cruise  
14 missile program; or”.

15 (c) SUNSET.—Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehen-  
16 sive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act  
17 of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)(2)) is amended by striking  
18 “and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch tech-  
19 nology” and inserting “, ballistic missiles and ballistic mis-  
20 sile launch technology, and unmanned aerial system (as  
21 defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for  
22 Iran Act of 2023) and cruise missile programs.”.

1 **SEC. 203. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS IN**  
2 **ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS UNDER**  
3 **COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES**  
4 **THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT.**

5 Section 107(a)(1) of the Countering America's Ad-  
6 versaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9406(a)(1))  
7 is amended by inserting "unmanned aerial systems (as de-  
8 fined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or Drones for Iran  
9 Act of 2023)," after "warships,".

10 **SEC. 204. INCLUSION OF UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS**  
11 **UNDER IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERA-**  
12 **TION ACT OF 1992.**

13 Section 1608(1) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Pro-  
14 liferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C.  
15 1701 note) is amended by inserting "unmanned aerial sys-  
16 tems (as defined in section 207 of the No ICBMs or  
17 Drones for Iran Act of 2023)," after "cruise missiles,".

18 **SEC. 205. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IRANIAN UNMANNED**  
19 **AERIAL SYSTEMS.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
21 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-  
22 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report  
23 (with a classified annex) that includes a strategy for coun-  
24 tering Iran's growing unmanned aerial systems program  
25 and its transfer of unmanned aerial systems and related  
26 technology to foreign states and non-state actors.



1 (b) PLAN TO PREVENT IRAN OBTAINING UNITED  
2 STATES MATERIALS.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—The strategy required by  
4 subsection (a) shall draw upon the work of the  
5 President Biden’s interagency task force inves-  
6 tigating the presence of United States parts in Ira-  
7 nian unmanned aerial systems to develop a plan for  
8 preventing Iran from obtaining United States mate-  
9 rials for its unmanned aerial system program.

10 (2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by para-  
11 graph (1) shall include the following:

12 (A) A list of identified United States com-  
13 ponents found in Iranian unmanned aerial sys-  
14 tems and a list of United States suppliers of  
15 those components.

16 (B) An assessment of existing export con-  
17 trols for components described in subparagraph  
18 (A) and a plan to strengthen those export con-  
19 trols, including through any necessary legisla-  
20 tive action by Congress.

21 (C) An investigation into and identification  
22 of foreign actors, including individuals and gov-  
23 ernment and nongovernmental entities, that are  
24 supplying components to the Iranian unmanned  
25 aerial system and weapons programs.

1 (D) Strategies to deny supply chains for  
2 such components, including any sanctions or  
3 other actions to target the individuals or enti-  
4 ties identified under subparagraph (C).

5 (E) An identification of any additional au-  
6 thorities or funding needed to enable the inves-  
7 tigation of how Iran is obtaining United States  
8 components for its unmanned aerial system pro-  
9 gram.

10 (F) An assessment of how the Bureau of  
11 Industry and Security of the Department of  
12 Commerce is monitoring compliance with their  
13 restrictions on Iranian unmanned aerial system  
14 producers aimed at ensuring United States and  
15 other foreign-made components are not being  
16 used in Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

17 (G) An investigation into Iran's use of  
18 shell companies to evade sanctions and restric-  
19 tions on the use of United States or other for-  
20 eign-made components in Iranian unmanned  
21 aerial system production.

22 (H) Strategies to ensure United States  
23 manufacturers of critical components for un-  
24 manned aerial systems can verify the end users  
25 of those components.

1 (I) Any other actions that could be use to  
2 disrupt Iran's unmanned aerial system and  
3 weapons programs and its transfers to foreign  
4 states and non-state actors.

5 (c) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.—The strategy required  
6 by subsection (a) shall include a diplomatic strategy to co-  
7 ordinate with allies of the United States to counter Iran's  
8 unmanned aerial system production and transfer of un-  
9 manned aerial systems and related technologies to foreign  
10 states and non-state actors, including the following:

11 (1) Coordination with respect to sanctions com-  
12 parable to the sanctions the United States is re-  
13 quired to apply under the amendments made by this  
14 title.

15 (2) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United  
16 States to determine how Iran is obtaining western  
17 components for its unmanned aerial system pro-  
18 gram.

19 (3) Intelligence sharing with allies of the United  
20 States to track, monitor, and disrupt Iranian trans-  
21 fers of its unmanned aerial system technology to for-  
22 eign states and non-state actors.

23 (4) A plan to cooperate with allies of the United  
24 States to develop or advance anti-unmanned aerial  
25 system equipment.

1 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES  
2 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-  
3 gressional committees” means—

4 (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
5 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-  
6 fairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and Se-  
7 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

8 (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the  
9 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on  
10 Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Com-  
11 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-  
12 tives.

13 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR IRAN’S UNMANNED**  
14 **AERIAL SYSTEM PROGRAM AND RELATED**  
15 **TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
17 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-  
18 fense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Di-  
19 rector of National Intelligence, the Secretary of the Treas-  
20 ury, and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the  
21 congressional defense committees a report that outlines  
22 the following:

23 (1) Domestic industries, individuals, or entities  
24 in Iran not subject to sanctions imposed by the  
25 United States as of the date of the report that are

1 helping to support Iran's unmanned aerial system  
2 program, including both public and private entities  
3 making a material contribution to Iran's production  
4 of unmanned aerial systems.

5 (2) A list of foreign states or non-state actors  
6 using Iranian unmanned aerial system technology or  
7 looking to purchase it, including any negotiations or  
8 discussions ongoing as of the date of the enactment  
9 of this Act between Iran and a foreign state or non-  
10 state actor to acquire such technology from Iran.

11 (3) An assessment of cooperation between Iran  
12 and the People's Republic of China to develop,  
13 produce, acquire, or export unmanned aerial system  
14 technology.

15 (4) An assessment of cooperation between Iran  
16 and the Russian Federation to develop, produce, ac-  
17 quire, or export unmanned aerial system technology,  
18 including a status update on Russian capabilities to  
19 produce Iranian unmanned aerial systems.

20 (5) An assessment on how the October 18,  
21 2023, expiration of sanctions and other restrictions  
22 under Annex B of United Nations Security Council  
23 Resolution 2231 (2015) have or have not increased  
24 cooperation between Iran and the Russian Federa-  
25 tion or Iran and the People's Republic of China re-

1       lating to transactions previously restricted under  
2       that resolution.

3       (b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)  
4 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include  
5 a classified annex.

6       (c) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE-  
7 FINED.—In this section, the term “congressional defense  
8 committees” has the meaning given that term in section  
9 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.

10 **SEC. 207. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM DEFINED.**

11       In this title, the term “unmanned aerial system”—

12           (1) means an aircraft without a human pilot  
13 onboard that is controlled by an operator remotely  
14 or programmed to fly autonomously; and

15           (2) includes—

16               (A) unmanned vehicles that conduct intel-  
17 ligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance oper-  
18 ations;

19               (B) unmanned vehicles that can loiter,  
20 such as suicide or kamikaze drones; and

21               (C) unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

1     **TITLE III—EXPANSION OF IRAN**  
2             **SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996**

3     **SEC. 301. EXPANSION OF IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.**

4             (a) EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO  
5 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND CONVENTIONAL  
6 WEAPONS.—Section 5(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of  
7 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is  
8 amended—

9                     (1) in the paragraph heading, by striking “EX-  
10 PORTS, TRANSFERS, AND TRANSSHIPMENTS” and in-  
11 serting “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND  
12 CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS”;

13                     (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking “the Iran  
14 Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of  
15 2012” and inserting “the No ICBMs or Drones for  
16 Iran Act of 2023”;

17                     (3) in subparagraph (B)—

18                             (A) in clause (i), by striking “would likely”  
19 and inserting “may”;

20                             (B) in clause (ii)—

21                                     (i) in subclause (I)—

22   (I) by striking “or develop” and  
23 inserting “develop, or export”; and

24   (II) by striking “; or” and insert-  
25 ing a semicolon;

1 (ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as  
2 subclause (IV); and

3 (iii) by inserting after subclause (I)  
4 the following:

5 “(II) acquire or develop ballistic  
6 missiles or ballistic missile launch  
7 technologies;

8 “(III) acquire or develop un-  
9 manned aerial systems (as defined in  
10 section 207 of the No ICBMs or  
11 Drones for Iran Act of 2023); or”.

12 (b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SPACE-LAUNCH  
13 AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS.—Section 5(b) of the  
14 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50  
15 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the  
16 following:

17 “(4) SPACE-LAUNCH AND BALLISTIC MISSILE  
18 GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY.—

19 “(A) TRANSFER TO IRAN.—Except as pro-  
20 vided in subsection (f), the President shall im-  
21 pose 5 or more of the sanctions described in  
22 section 6(a) with respect to a person if the  
23 President determines that the person, on or  
24 after the date of the enactment of the No  
25 ICBMs or Drones for Iran Act of 2023, know-



1           ingly exports, transfers, or permits or otherwise  
2           facilitates the transshipment or reexport of  
3           goods, services, technology, or other items to  
4           Iran that may support Iran’s efforts to acquire,  
5           develop, or export its space-launch programs,  
6           space-launch vehicles, or ballistic missiles or  
7           ballistic missile launch technologies.

8                   “(B) DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR  
9           DEVELOPMENT.—Except as provided in sub-  
10          section (f), the President shall impose 5 or  
11          more of the sanctions described in section 6(a)  
12          with respect to—

13                   “(i) an agency or instrumentality of  
14           the Government of Iran if the President  
15           determines that the agency or instrumen-  
16           tality knowingly, on or after the date of  
17           the enactment of the No ICBMs or Drones  
18           for Iran Act of 2023, seeks to develop, pro-  
19           cure, or acquire goods, services, or tech-  
20           nology that may support efforts by the  
21           Government of Iran with respect to space-  
22           launch vehicle or ballistic missile-related  
23           goods, services, and items listed on the  
24           Equipment, Software, and Technology  
25           Annex of the Missile Technology Control

1 Regime (commonly referred to as the  
2 ‘MTCR Annex’);

3 “(ii) a foreign person or an agency or  
4 instrumentality of a foreign state (as de-  
5 fined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United  
6 States Code) if the President determines  
7 that the person or agency or instrumen-  
8 tality knowingly, on or after such date of  
9 enactment, provides material support to  
10 the Government of Iran that may support  
11 efforts by the Government of Iran with re-  
12 spect to space-launch vehicle or ballistic  
13 missile-related goods, services, and items  
14 listed on the MTCR Annex; and

15 “(iii) a foreign person that the Presi-  
16 dent determines knowingly, on or after  
17 such date of enactment, engages in a  
18 transaction or transactions with, or pro-  
19 vides financial services for, a foreign per-  
20 son or an agency or instrumentality of a  
21 foreign state described in clause (i) or (ii)  
22 with respect to space-launch vehicle or bal-  
23 listic missile-related goods, services, and  
24 items listed on the MTCR Annex.

1           “(C) CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS.—Not  
2 later than 30 days after receiving a request  
3 from the chairman or ranking member of the  
4 appropriate congressional committees with re-  
5 spect to whether a person meets the criteria for  
6 the imposition of sanctions under subparagraph  
7 (A) or (B), the President shall—

8                   “(i) determine if the person meets  
9 such criteria; and

10                   “(ii) submit a report to the chairman  
11 or ranking member, as the case may be,  
12 who submitted the request with respect to  
13 that determination that includes a state-  
14 ment of whether or not the President im-  
15 posed or intends to impose sanctions with  
16 respect to the person.”.